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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Thomas Peterson appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. Peterson claims the 
district court dismissed his successive petition without first providing him notice of 
the reasons for dismissal and without first deciding whether he was entitled to 
counsel. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2010-10642 ("Case No. 10642"), the 
state charged Peterson with felony violation of a no contact order that prohibited 
Peterson from contacting Dorene Giannini. (#39146/#39147 R. 1, pp.224-225, 
241-242.) Pursuant to Peterson's motion, Case No. 10642 was consolidated 
with Ada Count Case No. CR-FE-2008-17740 ("Case No. 17740"), which 
involved another violation of a no contact order charge (third offense) involving 
Dorene to which Peterson pied guilty in January 2009. (#39146/#39147 R., 
1 Peterson filed a motion to take judicial notice of the "appellate records" in 
"Idaho Supreme Court Docket Numbers 39147 and 39783," which were 
consolidated on appeal. (Motion Requesting That The Court Take Judicial 
Notice, p.1, filed October 15, 2014.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted the 
motion and has "take[n] judicial notice of the Clerk's Record, Reporter's 
Transcripts, and Exhibits in Supreme Court Docket Nos. 39147 and 39783, State 
v. Thomas Edward Peterson." (Order Granting Motion Requesting The Court 
Take Judicial Notice, filed October 20, 2014.) In its order, the Court correctly 
"noted that Supreme Court Docket No. 39147 and 39783 were both consolidated 
to 39146 in a previous appeal, but 39146 has not been consolidated to this 
case." (Id.) Because the criminal case associated with Docket No. 39146 was 
consolidated at the trial level with the criminal case associated with Docket No. 
39147, contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that 
the Court also take judicial notice of the Clerk's Record, Reporter's Transcripts, 
and Exhibits in Docket No. 39146. 
1 
pp.12-13, 34-37, 54-55.) The cases were consolidated for "purposes of plea and 
sentencing" because the charge in Case No. 10642 resulted in a probation 
violation in Case No. 17740. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.129-131, 136-137, 245, 
252.) Peterson pied guilty to the felony charge in Case No. 10642 and admitted 
violating his probation in Case No. 177 40; the district court imposed a suspended 
sentence in Case No. 10642 and reinstated Peterson on probation in Case No. 
17740. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.138-143, 254-257, 259-264.) 
Three months later the state filed motions to violate Peterson's probation 
in both cases. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.157-160, 278-280.) Both motions alleged 
that Peterson again violated the no contact order, including that Peterson called 
Dorene 40 times and sent her 145 text messages between December 21, 2010, 
and December 25, 2010. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.158, 279.) The state later filed 
an amended motion that, in addition to the allegations regarding Peterson's no 
contact order violations, noted that the state had charged Peterson with another 
felony no contact order violation in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2011-3748 
("Case No. 3748") (Docket No. 39783). (#39146/#39147 R., pp.171-174, 291-
294.) At his arraignment on the probation violation allegations, defense counsel 
noted that the preliminary hearing on the "new charge" was set for March 25; 
accordingly, the court set the matter for review on March 31, 2011, with a 
probation violation hearing scheduled for April 21, 2011. (#39146/#39147 R., 
pp.176, 296.) 
In Case No. 3748, the preliminary hearing proceeded as scheduled on 
March 25, 2011, and the magistrate bound Peterson over to district court. 
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(#39783 R., pp.20-25.) At the subsequent March 31 review hearing in Case Nos. 
17740 and 10642, defense counsel noted he might request consolidation with a 
plea agreement in the "other" case. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.178, 298.) 
At the April 21 hearing scheduled for the probation violations, defense 
counsel requested a reset because the "new felony charge [was] set for trial in 
June." (#39146/#39147 R., pp.180, 300.) The court granted the request and 
scheduled the matter for review on June 16. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.180, 300.) 
On May 20, 2011, Peterson pied guilty to the felony violation of a no 
contact order in Case No. 3748. (#39783 R., pp.37-44; #39783 5/20/2011 Tr., 
p.19, L.11 - p.25, L.18.) 
On June 16, 2011, Peterson admitted violating his probation in Case Nos. 
177 40 and 10642 by having contact with Dorene and by "a specific instance of 
violation, to which [Peterson] pied guilty" and was "awaiting sentencing," 
presumably referring to Case No. 3748 (#39146/#39147 6/16/2011 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.11-25, p.16, L.18 - p.18, L.5.) Peterson appeared before the court the 
following day in Case No. 37 48 at which time defense counsel noted the court in 
Peterson's other cases ordered a mental health evaluation the day prior;2 the 
court therefore reset the case for review and possible sentencing. (#39783 R., 
p.46.) At a subsequent review hearing, the court in Case No. 3748 indicated it 
would not impose sentence until the court sentenced Peterson on his probation 
violations in Case Nos. 17740 and 10642. (#39783 R., p.52.) 
2 The Honorable Patrick Owen presided over Case No. 3748 and the Honorable 
Mike Wetherell presided over Case Nos. 17740 and 10642. 
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On September 6, 2011, the court revoked Peterson's probation in Case 
Nos. 17740 and 10642 and ordered his sentences executed. (#39146/#39147 
R., pp.195-197, 316-318.) Peterson requested a reduction in his sentences, 
which the district court denied. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.199, 215-218, 320, 336-
339.) 
On September 14, 2011, the court imposed sentence in Case No. 3748, 
ordering a five-year sentence with one and one-half years fixed, to run 
consecutive to the sentences imposed in Case Nos. 177 40 and 10642. (#39783 
R., pp.55-57.) Peterson also requested reconsideration of the sentence in Case 
No. 3748, which the district court denied. (#39783 R., pp.60, 69-72.) 
In his consolidated appeal in Case Nos. 17740, 10642, and 3748 (Docket 
Nos. 39146/39147/39783), Peterson raised three issues: (1) whether the district 
court violated his rights "by failing to maintain an accurate copy of the record in 
his case"; (2) whether the court abused its discretion by revoking Peterson's 
probation in Case Nos. 177 40 and 10642; and (3) whether the court abused its 
discretion by denying Peterson's Rule 35 motions. (#39146/#39147/#39783 
Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The Idaho Court of Appeals denied relief on all three 
issues and affirmed. State v. Peterson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 408 
(Idaho App. March 19, 2013). 
On June 6, 2012, while his direct appeal was pending, Peterson filed a 
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petition for post-conviction relief in relation to Case No. 10642. (#41088 R. 3, 
pp.3-9.) The allegations in Peterson's initial petition included assertions that 
evidence "exist[ed]" that was "not previously presented or heard" that "may 
require" Peterson's sentence to be "vacated," and that counsel was ineffective 
because he allegedly did not give "adequate" or "competent advice" before 
Peterson "accepted" the plea agreement, and did not ask "for a better plea 
aggreement [sic]." (#41088 R., pp.4-5.) In his supporting affidavit, Peterson 
averred that on December 4, 2009, Dorene filed a motion to modify or dismiss 
the no contact order in which Dorene stated (verbatim): "If its in place I can't 
visit, write, or speak with him. I don't want this order I am not afraid of Tom or in 
need of protection. I want to be with him. Please remove it. If not for Tom, for 
myself."4 (#41088 R., p.8.) Peterson further averred that if the no contact order 
would have been dismissed at that time, "the future felony cases that occurred in 
2010 & 2011 wouldn'tve [sic] occurred" and he "should've received advice by a 
counselor before accepting the plea agreement." (#41088 R., p.8.) The district 
court granted Peterson's request for counsel on his first petition. (#41088 R., 
pp.10-12, 22-23.) 
3 The state's motion for judicial notice filed contemporaneously with this brief also 
includes a request to take judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and the appellate 
pleadings in Docket No. 41088, which is the appeal from the dismissal of 
Peterson's initial post-conviction petition related to Case No. 10642. 
4 A review of the record in Docket Nos. 39146/39147 shows that this is an 
accurate representation of a motion to modify the no contact order filed by 
Dorene in Case No. 17740. (#39146/#39147 R., p.97.) The district court held a 
hearing on Dorene's request and amended the no contact order in that case to 
allow telephone contact. (#39146/#39147 R., pp.99-101.) 
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After the court issued a notice of intent to dismiss, and following a stay 
while Peterson litigated his direct appeal, post-conviction counsel filed a Notice of 
Intent to Proceed on Original Petition and Request for Hearing, noting that, 
"[u]pon investigation," he was "unable to amend the pleadings pursuant to the 
UPCPA and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." (#41088 R., pp.30-37, 75-76.) 
The district court ultimately dismissed Peterson's petition because Peterson 
failed to allege a "prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel." 
(#41088 R., pp.85-88.) 
Peterson appealed the dismissal of his first post-conviction petition and 
the court appointed the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") to represent 
him on appeal. (#41088 R., pp.91-97.) The SAPD, however, was granted leave 
to withdraw; the basis of the SAPD's request to withdraw was appellate counsel's 
inability to identify a viable issue to raise on appeal. (#41088 Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated November 20, 2013; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, dated November 20, 2013; Order Granting Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed December 31, 2013.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Peterson's appeal because 
Peterson failed to timely file a brief. (#41088 Order of Dismissal, filed June 20, 
2014.) 
On January 23, 2014, Peterson filed a successive petition for post-
conviction relief, raising three claims: (1) a "due process violation by failing to 
maintain an accurate copy of the record of this case"; (2) ineffective assistance of 
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counsel; and (3) a "civil rights violation." (R., pp.3-6.) Peterson's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was based on counsel's alleged failure to notify the 
court "and or" the prosecutor that Peterson requested a binding Rule 11 plea 
agreement and counsel's alleged failure to obtain a transcript of the preliminary 
hearing "involving CR-FE-2011-0003748." (R., pp.4-5.) Peterson also filed a 
motion requesting the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.17-19.) On February 24, 
2014, the district court entered an order denying Peterson's request for counsel 
and a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R., pp.22-26.) 
On that same date, the state filed an answer to Peterson's petition. (R., pp.27-
30.) 
On March 3, 2014, Peterson filed a response to the court's February 24, 
2014 order and notice. (R., pp.31-34.) Three weeks later, on March 24, 2014, 
the court entered an order dismissing Peterson's successive petition and a Final 
Judgment. (R., pp.35-44.) Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal and the 




Peterson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. 
Peterson's successive petition without providing him notice of 
the reason for dismissal and providing him a meaningful 
opportunity to respond thereto? 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. 
Peterson's petition without first resolving the question of 
whether counsel should be appointed and when his allegations 
established the possibility of a valid claim? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Peterson failed to show reversible error in the summary dismissal of 
his successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Peterson Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal Of 
His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Peterson asserts the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his 
successive post-conviction petition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-16.) Peterson 
presents two arguments in support of this assertion. First, Peterson claims the 
district court erred by failing to provide him notice that his petition could be 
dismissed on the grounds that it was a successive petition, which is barred by 
I.C. § 19-4908 unless the petitioner shows a sufficient reason why his claims 
were not raised in his original petition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Second, 
Peterson claims the district court erred by dismissing his petition without first 
deciding whether he alleged the possibility of a valid claim entitling him to the 
appointment of counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) Both of Peterson's 
arguments fail. 
Although Peterson correctly asserts that the district court did not give him 
notice that his successive petition could be dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908, 
the court dismissed Peterson's successive petition on the alternative basis that 
Peterson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact - a basis that was 
included in the court's notice of intent to dismiss and is not challenged on appeal. 
(R., pp.40-42.) Further, this Court can find any error in the lack of notice of 
dismissal based on I.C. § 19-4908 harmless in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), in which the 
Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's successive petition for the reason, 
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articulated for the first time on appeal, that ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason for purposes of I.C. § 19-4908. 
With respect to Peterson's second argument - that the court erred by 
dismissing his successive petition without first considering his request for counsel 
- the record shows that the court did consider the request in conjunction with its 
notice of intent to dismiss and the authority upon which Peterson relies does not 
compel the conclusion that the district court was required to reconsider the 
request before finally dismissing Peterson's petition. 
8. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Because The District Court Dismissed Peterson's Petition On A Basis 
That Peterson Received Notice Of, And Which Peterson Does Not 
Challenge On Appeal, This Court Does Not Need To Consider Any Lack 
Of Notice Of Dismissal Based On I.C. § 19-4908 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(b) allows a district court to issue a notice of 
intent to dismiss if it is "satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or 
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief 
and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings." When the district 
court issues a notice of intent pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), it must give the 
applicant "an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal." 
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In its summary dismissal order, the district court notified Peterson of its 
intent to dismiss his successive petition because Peterson failed to allege a 
genuine issue of material fact. (R., p.25.) The state filed an answer the same 
day asserting, among other defenses, that Peterson's petition was successive 
and therefore procedurally barred by I.C. § 19-4908(b). (R., p.29.) Idaho Code 
Section 19-4908(b) provides that "All grounds for relief available to an applicant 
under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended 
application" and that "[a]ny ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligent waived . . . may not be the basis for a 
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which 
for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application." The district court included I.C. § 19-
4908 as grounds for dismissal in its final dismissal order even though it was not 
included in the court's notice - a point which the court acknowledged. (R., pp.37-
38.) 
Peterson's entire lack of notice claim is premised on the district court's 
failure to give him 20-days notice that his petition could be dismissed based on 
I.C. § 19-4908. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Peterson does not, however, 
explain why this Court should address the lack of notice of dismissal based on 
1.C. § 19-4908 given the alternative ground for dismissal, which was included in 
the court's notice of intent to dismiss, that Peterson failed to allege a genuine 
issue of material fact (R., pp.25, 40-41) - a conclusion Peterson does not 
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challenge on appeal (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.8-165). When the basis 
for a trial court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate court will affirm 
on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 
1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). This Court should, therefore, uphold the summary 
dismissal of Peterson's successive post-conviction petition on the district court's 
alternative and unchallenged basis for dismissal. kl 
This Court may also conclude that the lack of notice of dismissal based on 
I.C. § 19-4908 is harmless. The Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Murphy, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365, supports application of harmless error in 
this case. Murphy, like this case, involved a successive petition. kl at 390-391, 
327 P.3d at 366-367. Murphy asserted that ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel was a sufficient reason to allow her to file a successive 
petition. kl at 392, 327 P.3d at 368. The district court rejected this argument 
because "Murphy failed to show that her prior post-conviction counsel 
inadequately presented her claims in her original petition or otherwise waived 
meritorious claims." kl 
5 Although Peterson claims he alleged facts which raised the possibility of a valid 
claim that he believes entitled him to the appointment of counsel (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.11-16), such a claim is different than an argument that Peterson alleged 
a genuine issue of material fact that entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. As 
the Court of Appeals noted in Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P .3d 1, 3 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (citation omitted): "The determination whether to appoint counsel and 
the determination whether a petition is subject to summary dismissal are thus 
controlled by quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is 
necessary in order to gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than 
that which is necessary to avoid summary dismissal of a petition." Even if this 
Court considers whether Peterson alleged a genuine issue of material fact, the 
district court correctly concluded he did not. (See R., pp.40-42 (Appendix A).) 
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On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court, in deciding whether Murphy could 
"bring a successive petition under § 19-4908 ... first look[ed] at her post-
conviction procedural history." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369. The 
Court noted that Murphy filed her first petition in 2004, which ultimately resulted 
in an evidentiary hearing on some of her claims. 1st at 393-394, 327 P.3d at 369-
370. While her appeal from her original petition was pending, Murphy filed her 
successive petition "alleging a number of claims regarding ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel and seeking the appointment of counsel." 1st at 394, 
327 P.3d at 370. "The district court found that Murphy had failed to raise the 
possibility of a valid claim as to any of her claims and so denied the appointment 
of counsel and summarily dismissed her successive petition." 1st 
On appeal from the dismissal of her successive petition, Murphy 
acknowledged she already litigated one post-conviction case, but argued that, 
even though she had no new evidence to present, she could pursue a 
successive petition "raising new claims and reasserting claims from her first 
petition" because counsel in the original post-conviction case had been 
ineffective. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394, 327 P.3d at 370. The Court rejected 
Murphy's argument, holding that "because Murphy ha[d] no statutory or 
constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she [could 
not] demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition based on 
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel." 1st at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. The 
Court therefore affirmed the district court's order denying Murphy's request for 
counsel and summarily dismissing her successive petition. 
13 
Although Peterson, unlike Murphy, did not allege a sufficient reason or 
explain why he should be permitted to avoid the successive petition bar, a review 
of his post-conviction case history shows that, despite his claim otherwise, there 
is no reasonably legitimate reason that would allow him to pursue a successive 
petition relating to his claim that counsel, in representing him in Case No. 10642, 
was ineffective for failing to request a preliminary hearing transcript from Case 
No. 3748.6 (Appellant's Brief, p.10 n.3 (claiming it is possible he "could, given 
the meaningful opportunity (particularly if he were afforded the assistance of 
counsel), [to] justify why [his] claims were not presented in his initial petition").) 
When Peterson filed his first post-conviction petition in relation to Case No. 
10642, he was obviously aware that he admitted the probation violation 
allegation that was based on the charge in Case No. 3748 and did so without first 
reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript from that case. Moreover, it is a 
mystery why he would need to review the transcript of a hearing he attended 
before he could be aware of what happened at that hearing. (#39783 R., pp.20-
23 (court minutes from preliminary hearing in Case No. 3748, which include 
notation that Peterson was "present, in custody").) In any event, Peterson was 
undoubtedly aware of the basic factual predicate of his current claim at the time 
he filed his first post-conviction petition and the state cannot conceive a basis for 
him to assert otherwise. Cf. Judd, 148 Idaho at 26, 218 P.3d at 5 (in addressing 
6 Although Peterson raised other claims in his successive petition, Peterson "is 
not challenging the decision to dismiss the due process and civil rights claims," 
and it appears the only ineffective assistance of counsel claim he believes is 
"possibly valid" is his claim that counsel should have requested a preliminary 
hearing transcript. (Appellant's Brief, p.3 n.2 and pp.11-15.) 
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issue of tolling and whether the petitioner raised the possibility of a valid claim, 
Court noted it is the discovery of facts, not the discovery of law that would allow 
for tolling). 
Further, the gist of Peterson's first post-conviction petition, at least as it 
related to the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, was that counsel 
failed to adequately advise him regarding his guilty plea, and the facts he offered 
in support of the claim were based on Dorene's desire to have contact with him 
and her attempt to modify the no contact order to allow for such. (#41088 R., 
pp.5, 8.) While Peterson's successive claim is based on missing telephone 
records to support the state's charge in Case No. 3748, his desire for those 
records was to establish that Dorene wanted to have contact with him and 
allegedly "manipulated and bribed [him] to continue contact." (R., pp.8, 32.) 
Thus, the essence of Peterson's successive petition claim is the same as the 
claim in his first post-conviction case; he is just approaching his assertion from a 
different angle. It is also worth nothing that Peterson had the assistance of post-
conviction counsel in his first case and that attorney, after investigating the 
matter, found no other evidence to offer in support of Peterson's petition. (R., 
p.76.) 
Given the foregoing history of Peterson's post-conviction proceedings and 
the Court's conclusion in Murphy that ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel is not sufficient reason to pursue a successive petition, even if Peterson 
would claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective, there appears to be no 
legitimate factual or legal reason that would allow Peterson to avoid the 
15 
successive petition bar in LC. § 19-4908. Even though the district court did not 
give Peterson notice of dismissal on this basis, the petitioner in Murphy also did 
not receive notice that her successive petition could be dismissed because 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel did not constitute a sufficient 
reason, but the Court affirmed the summary court's dismissal for this reason. 
This Court could likewise affirm the summary dismissal of Peterson's petition 
based on I.C. § 19-4908 despite the lack of notice. 
Because Peterson does not challenge the district court's dismissal of his 
successive petition on the ground that he failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact, this Court need not address his claim regarding the lack of notice of 
dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Even if considered, based on the 
information in the record, Peterson's post-conviction history, and the fact that any 
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel, although not alleged by Peterson, 
would not qualify as a sufficient reason for filing a successive petition, this Court 
may affirm the district court's dismissal on this alternative basis despite the lack 
of notice. 
D. Peterson's Claim That The District Court Failed To Address His Request 
For Counsel Before Dismissing His Petition Is Without Merit As Is His 
Claim That He Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim Entitling Him To 
Counsel 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 392, 327 P.3d at 368. The 
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the 
discretion of the district court. kl (citing Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 738, 228 
16 
P.3d 998, 1005 (2010)); Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 
1108, 1111 (2004)) If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007). Requests for post-conviction counsel must, however, be 
addressed "before denying post-conviction relief on its merits." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
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questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676,678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 
P. 3d at 1111 . 
In conjunction with its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court first 
considered Peterson's request for counsel. (R., pp.22-24.) In doing so, the court 
cited and applied the correct legal standards and concluded Peterson was not 
entitled to counsel because he failed to allege the possibility of a valid claim. 
(Id.) Specifically, with respect to Peterson's claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request the preliminary hearing transcript in Case No. 37 48, the court 
stated: 
While trial courts are to liberally appoint counsel where the 
petitioner alleges facts raising the possibility of a viable claim, a 
bare statement that counsel did not ask for a particular transcript at 
state expense does not provide enough information for the Court to 
make such a threshold determination, because such a decision by 
counsel standing alone is not deficient performance. Further, 
counsel's refusal of a defendant's request that he or she ask the 
Court for a particular preliminary hearing transcript in no way 
supports an inference that counsel did not investigate whether 
some aspect of the hearing might be used to support the defense. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Peterson's motion for 
appointment of counsel at the public's expense is hereby DENIED. 
(R., p.24 (emphasis original).) 
After considering and denying Peterson's request for counsel, the court 
articulated the reasons it intended to dismiss Peterson's petition and notified him 
he had 20 days to respond. (R., p.25.) The court also gave Peterson direction 
on what information should be included in his response and advised Peterson 
that "[u]pon timely receipt of [his] supplemental affidavit, the Court [would] 
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reconsider the issue of appointing counsel and whether the petition should be 
dismissed." (R., p.25.) Peterson thereafter filed a response to the court's notice 
after which the court entered an order dismissing his petition. (R., pp.31-42.) As 
previously noted, the court dismissed the successive petition on two bases - I.C. 
§ 19-4908 and Peterson's failure to allege a genuine issue of material fact. (R., 
pp.39-42.) 
On appeal, Peterson complains that the court erred by dismissing his 
petition without first resolving whether he raised the possibility of a valid claim 
entitling him to counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) According to Peterson, he 
"renewed his request for appointment of counsel" and the court was required to 
"address that motion before deciding the substantive question of whether 
summary dismissal was appropriate." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) This argument is 
factually and legally erroneous. 
Peterson concluded his affidavit in response to the court's notice of intent 
to dismiss with the following statement: "This is why I ask the courts [sic] for a 
successive post-conviction as well as a conflict attorney." (R., p.33.) This hardly 
constitutes a "motion" renewing Peterson's initial request for counsel, which the 
court had already denied. Even if it did, the law did not require the district court 
to expressly address, yet again, Peterson's desire for counsel. All the law 
requires is that the district court consider a request for counsel "before denying 
the post-conviction relief on the merits." Charboneau, supra. The court clearly 
did so before denying Peterson's petition on the merits when it considered and 
denied the request along with issuing its notice of intent to dismiss. Peterson has 
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cited no authority for the proposition that the court was required to address the 
request anew just because Peterson mentioned his desire for counsel in 
response to the court's notice. In fact, the Court's opinion in Workman, 144 
Idaho 518, 164 P .3d 798, supports a contrary conclusion. 
Workman filed a petition for post-conviction relief and requested counsel. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 'The district judge ruled that she 
would not appoint counsel unless she determined there was a valid basis for 
post-conviction relief." 19.:. The state filed an answer and a motion to dismiss 
and, "[w]ithout further notice, the district court dismissed Workman's petition and 
entered judgment as a matter of law for the State." 19.:. The district court 
summarily dismissed Workman's petition because it found Workman failed to 
allege a genuine issue of material fact and, "[h)aving concluded there were no 
potential claims to investigate, the district court also denied appointment of 
counsel for Workman." 19.:. 
On appeal, Workman challenged, among other things, the district court's 
denial of his request for counsel. Workman, 144 Idaho at 529, 164 P.3d at 809. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Workman's argument, stating: "The district 
court's thorough review of Workman's allegations supports, as a reasonable 
exercise of discretion, her finding that Workman's claims were frivolous and 
required no further investigation." 19.:. 
While Workman did not squarely address the timing of the district court's 
denial, which is the basis of Peterson's complaint, the district court's actions in 
Workman were consistent with the district court's actions in this case. Here, the 
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district court, consistent with the law, considered Peterson's request before 
dismissing his petition. The court then considered the additional information 
provided by Peterson before issuing a final decision dismissing his petition. It is 
apparent from the court's final dismissal decision that it considered all of the facts 
alleged by Peterson as well as the record and found there was no basis for 
pursuing the claims further. (R., pp.40-42.) In other words, the district court 
"thorough[ly] reviewed" Peterson's allegations and found Peterson "raised no 
allegations sufficient to require the appointment of counsel." Workman, 144 
Idaho at 529, 164 P.3d at 809. Peterson has failed to show the manner in which 
the district addressed his request for counsel was erroneous. 
Peterson has also failed to show error in the district court's determination 
that he failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim that would require the 
appointment of counsel. Peterson's relevant successive post-conviction claim 
was that he asked his attorney7 "to provide the defense with a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing in [Case No. 3748]" so that he could "provide the courts [sic] 
with factual evidence that [Dorene] not only initiated contact but manipulated and 
bribed [him] to continue contact even though there was a no contact order." (R., 
pp.31-32.) Peterson further asserted that the transcript would show that an 
exhibit admitted at the preliminary hearing in Case No. 3748 would support his 
7 Peterson identifies the attorney to whom he made the request as Ransom 
Bailey (R., p.31 ); however, Mr. Bailey did not represent Peterson in Case No. 
10642, which is the underlying criminal case to which his successive petition 
relates (R., p.3). While Mr. Bailey represented Peterson in Case No. 3748 (see 
#39783 R., pp.34-36), Nick Wollen represented Peterson in Case No. 10642 (see 
#39146/#39147 R., pp.295-301). The state will assume Peterson provided the 
wrong name in his response to the court's notice since Peterson could not claim 
counsel from a completely different case was ineffective in Case No. 10642. 
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claim. (R., p.32.) Finally, Peterson averred that "after reading the preliminary 
[sic] transcripts, [he] would've asked the courts to provide defense with Exhibit A" 
and "it would have been found that evidence did not exist" and he "would have 
taken [Case No. 3748] to trial." (R., p.33.) These allegations do not show the 
possibility of a valid claim that counsel was ineffective in Case No. 10642. 
As previously noted, Peterson was present at the preliminary hearing in 
Case No. 37 48 and did not need to read the transcript to know what evidence 
was presented at that hearing. Peterson was certainly also aware that he did not 
read the preliminary hearing transcript before admitting the probation violations in 
Case No. 10642, which is the only conceivable event that could be relevant to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in that case. Further, whether he would 
have "taken [Case No. 37 48] to trial" had he read the transcript of a hearing at 
which he was present does not mean it was deficient (or prejudicial) for counsel 
not to obtain the transcript before Peterson admitted his probation violations in 
Case No. 10642, especially since the charge (and subsequent guilty plea) in 
Case No. 3748 was only one of the violations Peterson admitted and one of only 
several the state alleged. For these reasons and given the other facts the district 
court relied on its dismissal order8 (R., pp.40-41 ), and considering this is a 
successive petition for which there is no apparent sufficient reason warranting its 
8 While the district court's summary dismissal order addressed Peterson's failure 
to allege a genuine issue of material fact, which, as noted, is a different standard 
than the possibility of a valid claim standard, Judd, supra, the district court's 
discussion of the facts and procedural history are still relevant to whether 
Peterson alleged a possibly valid claim for purposes of appointing counsel. 
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consideration, Peterson has failed to show error in the district court's denial of his 
request for the appointment of counsel. 
Peterson's claims that the district court erred in not considering his 
request for counsel prior to dismissing his petition on the merits and erred in 
concluding he failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district 
court's order summarily dismissing Peterson's successive petition for post-
conviction relief. 
DATED this 8th day of January 2015. 
~ 
J~~~;,jA M. LORELLO 
De\J Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of January 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
BRIAN DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JES~CA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
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Case No. CV-PC-2014-01288 
ORDER FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 
LC.§ 19-4906(b) 
--
Presently before the Court is Mr. Peterson's successive petition for post-conviction relief 
filed on January 23, 2014. Simultaneously with the filing of his petition, Mr. Peterson requested 
the appointment of counsel at the public's expense. The state filed its answer on February 24, 
2014, and on that same date the Court issued its order denying the petitioner's motion for 
counsel and its notice of intent to dismiss the petition in twenty days pursuant to section 19-
4906(b ), Idaho Code. Petitioner timely responded to the Court's notice through the filing of an 
affidavit on March 3, 2014. 
BACKGROUND 
In the underlying case, Ada County case number CR-FE-2011-0003748, Petitioner pled 
guilty to a single count of felony Violation of a No Contact Order on August 19, 2010. 
Accordingly, on September 30, 2010, this Court sentenced him to a maximum term of five years, 
with the first three and one-half years fixed. However, the Court suspended execution of the 
judgment and placed the defendant on probation, which Mr. Peterson then violated by, inter alia, 
again violating the no-contact order at issue in the underlying case. This Court revoked the 
defendant's probation on September 1, 2011, and imposed his original sentence. On September 
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7, 2011, the defendant filed a motion under Rule 3 5 for reconsideration of sentence in the 
underlying case and in case number CR-FE-2008-0017740 (also a case involving a felony 
violation of the no-contact order at issue). On October 19, 2011, the Court denied the motion. 
Toe petitioner's first petition for post-conviction relief (CV-PC-2012-10238) followed on June 6, 
2012, in which the defendant alleged that his sentence was excessive and in which he added 
allegations concerning the competence of his trial counsel with respect to the plea agreement he 
accepted. That petition was dismissed on May 5, 2013. 
In his present, successive petition, petitioner raised the following claims as described in 
the Court's notice of intent to dismiss: (a) "due process violation by failing to maintain an 
accurate copy of the record in this case;" (b) "Ineffective assistance of counsel;" and (c) "civil 
rights violation." The precise failures he attributes to his counsel are that counsel allegedly 
"failed to notify courts and or prosecution Defendant request a rule # 11 binding the plea 
agreement" and "failed to motion as requested by the defendant to receive court transcripts from 
the preliminary hearing involving CR-FE-2011-0003748." Petition ,i 9. In his affidavit of facts, 
Mr. Peterson claims that "the district courts" misplaced records that were relied upon in 
fashioning his sentence, specifically, telephone records used to establish his violation of one or 
more no-contact orders. It appears this allegation goes to his claims denominated (a) and (c) 
above. The specific relief Mr. Peterson is seeking is to have his sentences in Ada County case 
numbers CR-FE-2010-0010642 and CR-FE-2011-0003748 run concurrently. 
The Court held in its notice of intent to dismiss that claims (a) and (c) were procedurally 
barred since these claims were raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to the petitioner. 
The Court noted that claim (b) (ineffective assistance of counsel) was unsupported by any 
admissible evidence and hence was subject to summary dismissal. However, the Court gave the 
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petitioner an opportunity to file additional materials in support of that claim as required by 
section 19-4906(b ). In his supplemental affidavit, the petitioner explains that his trial counsel, 
Mr. Ransom Bailey, provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain transcripts of the 
preliminary hearing held in the underlying case that would have "provide[d] the courts with 
factual evidence that [the victim protected by the no-contact order] not only initiated contact but 
munipulated [sic] and bribed me to continue contact even though there was a no contact order." 
The petitioner also states that the transcript would have shown that the state relied on "exhibit A" 
for the magistrate's finding of probable cause, which consisted of phone records and text 
message records, which records (in his view) prove his argument that he was manipulated and 
bribed by the victim into committing the violations. He also states that if Mr. Bailey would have 
obtained the transcript, he and/or the petitioner would have realized that state's exhibit "A" did 
not exist (a fact the petitioner apparently has inferred because the text messages and phone 
records were not contained in the appellate record in his direct appeal) and hence he (the 
petitioner) would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
I. SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature; it is 
distinct from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). Like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden of 
proving the allegations upon which the petition for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). 
However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action, in that 




"[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim." State 
v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008). The applicant for post-conviction relief is 
required to make a prima facie case by presenting admissible evidence on each essential element 
of his or her claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 
19-4903. 
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely on 
substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the record. Martinez at 844; Holmes v. State, 104 
Idaho 312,658 P.2d 983 (1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by 
any admissible evidence, need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 
898 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct.App.1982). If 
the allegations fail to frame a genuine issue of material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary 
prima facie elements of a claim for relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to 
dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing." LC. § l 9-4906(b); I.C.R. 57(c); Parrott, 
117 Idaho 272, 787 P.2d 258 (1990). However, if the application raises a material issue of fact, 
the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each 
such issue. I.C. § 19-4907(a); Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994). 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised in a post-conviction 
setting. See Mathews, 839 P.2d 1215, 1219 (citing Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671,674, 603 P.2d 
1005, 1008 (1979). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must overcome 
the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that 
counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Roman, 125 Idaho at 
648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03. 
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Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-part test set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Under this test, the 
petitioner must not only demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, but must also 
show that the deficient performance was prejudicial. Id., 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-
65. To establish deficient performance, the applicant must prove that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To prove prejudice, the applicant must 
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694; Parrott, 117 Idaho at 274-75, 787 P.2d at 
260-62. This latter "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's ineffective 
performance impacted the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 
370-71 (1985); Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,825 P.2d 94 (Ct.App.1992). In order to avoid 
summary dismissal, Petitioner must allege sufficient facts under both parts of the test. Martinez 
v. State, 125 Idaho 844,875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994). 
DISCUSSION 
I. Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been procedurally defaulted 
because it was not raised in his prior petition. 
Although the Court overlooked this issue in its notice, the State correctly pointed out in 
its answer that because this is a successive petition, "[a]ll grounds for relief available to an 
applicant under this act must be raised in [the] original, supplemental, or amended application." 
I.C. § 19-4908. The petitioner's ineffective assistance claim(s) relating to Mr. Bailey's failure to 
obtain a preliminary hearing transcript appear for the first time in this supplemental petition and 
hence are waived, "unless the court finds a ... sufficient reason [it] was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." Id. Petitioner has not 
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offered any such reason, and it appears he could not, because based upon the claim itself, he 
necessarily knew of Mr. Bailey's allegedly deficient performance long before he filed his first 
petition for post-conviction relief. 1 Thus, he knowingly and voluntarily waived it when he failed 
to include it in his first petition, and it must be dismissed. 
II. In the alternative to waiver, the petitioner has failed to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim(s). 
The allegation that Mr. Bailey failed to obtain a transcript of the preliminary hearing, even if 
true, cannot support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on any of the theories asserted 
by the petitioner. First, even if the transcript and any exhibits showed that the victim actively 
solicited, encouraged, and/or "bribed" or "manipulated" the petitioner into (once more) violating 
the no-contact order in issue, such evidence is not a defense to the charge. It is relevant, if at all, 
only in mitigation of sentencing and/or probation violation proceedings, where it was in fact 
offered by the petitioner. Mr. Bailey acted competently in not advising the petitioner to go to 
trial based upon such evidence, assuming it existed, and the petitioner could have experienced no 
prejudice from this advice or from Mr. Bailey's failure to obtain the transcript. 
Petitioner also claims that the transcript, had it been obtained, would have enabled him to 
discover the non-existence of the text and phone records used by the state to establish probable 
cause that he had violated the no-contact order in issue. Such a discovery, he claims, would have 
prompted him to take the case to trial. 
This claim fails for two reasons. First, the disposition of the underlying case was already 
affirmed over the petitioner's objection that the text and phone records in issue were missing 
1 Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has very recently clarified that the inadequate representation of prior post-
conviction counsel is no longer a sufficient basis for accepting a claim raised for the first time in a successive 
petition. Murphy v. State, 40483, 2014 WL 712695 (Idaho Feb. 25, 2014) (not yet released for publication). 
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from the appellate record. This claim appears to be an unsubtle attempt to relitigate the issue of 
the missing records, and the Court will not consider issues barred by the doctrine of res Judi cat a. 
Second, there is a crucial distinction between claiming that certain documents were not 
included in the appellate record and claiming that those documents did not exist as exhibits in a 
particular hearing, or did not exist at all. Petitioner, reasoning backward from the absence of 
phone and text message records in the appellate record, appears to assume from that absence that 
the phone and text message records never existed, or at least had been lost by a particular point 
in time, and hence the state had no proof with which to convict him. Petitioner also neglects to 
square this claim with his repeated admission that he did violate the no-contact order and that the 
records of his communications with the victim would prove his theory that the victim 
manipulated him into violating the o~der. In any event, it cannot be ineffective assistance of 
counsel for Mr. Bailey to fail to obtain a particular transcript in order to see if a particular exhibit 
had fortuitously been lost by the state. If the records in question are in fact lost at this point, it is 
clear enough on this record that no one knew they had gone missing until the appeal. Counsel's 
performance is assessed in light of the facts and circumstances known or existent at the time the 
performance is rendered, not with the benefit of hindsight. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 147, 
139 P.3d 741, 749 (Ct. App. 2006). Additionally, it appears that the petitioner has never denied 
the contact that occurred, only the extent to which he initiated it. Thus, Mr. Bailey would have 
had no reason to obtain the transcript in issue, since his client admitted to the crime. 
For all these reasons, petitioner's supplemented allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the part of Mr. Bailey fail to supply sufficient facts under either prong of the 
Strickland test to create a genuine issue of material fact for hearing. Further, his other claims 
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are, as noted in the Court's prior notice of intent, procedurally barred since they were raised on 
direct appeal. Accordi...'1gly, the petition will be dismissed . 
. ,,,.,6r 
SO ORDERED AND DATED th1~ day of March, 2014. 
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